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Abstract. Supply chains often consist of stakeholders with different power le-
vels collaborating with each other in order to meet customer demand.  This im-
balance of power along the supply chain is a critical factor that affects its short 
and long-term behavior, as well as its overall stability and efficiency. The role 
and the impacts of power in distribution channels have been explored quite ex-
tensively in Marketing, but far less so with regard to power in the context of 
supply chains. This paper explores the effect of power on supply chain func-
tioning by focusing on a specific power type i.e. coercive power. More specifi-
cally, the impact of power and power awareness on inventory replenishment 
human decision-making is investigated. An experimental approach with un-
known market demand and local information availability is implemented so as 
to provide a controlled environment for decision-making. Three different treat-
ments are implemented in order to create situations of balanced power, imba-
lanced power without awareness and imbalanced power with awareness.  
Results show that power awareness does play a significant role in the way coer-
cive power is exercised. In particular, a significant increase of the size and va-
riability of order quantity and order time interval is observed in the case of  
imbalanced power with awareness.  
Keywords: Coercive power, decentralized supply chain, inventory replenish-
ment, power awareness, human decision-making.  
1 Background 
Power in supply chain is the ability of one firm (source) to influence the actions and 
intents of another firm (target) it deals with [Maloni and Benton, 2000]. Power in 
supply chain can be either balanced or imbalanced. Balanced power exists when 
stakeholders in the chain possess broadly similar levels of power in influencing each 
other’s decisions, while imbalanced power exists when one or more partners (sources) 
are capable of manipulating decisions of the other partners (targets) because of their 
power position [Muthusamy and White, 2006]. The exercising of power in a supply 
chain can have positive, as well as negative effects on its overall performance. Some 
of these effects can be visible immediately but most of them emerge out over a longer 
period of time [Hanf and Belaya, 2009]. 
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Amongst the various power types defined by French and Raven (1959), coercive 
power is referred to as the ability of a source to punish a target in case of failures.  
Based on studies done by Yeung et al. (2009), coercive power tends to improve sup-
plier integrations, with or without the presence of trust, which is again a positive out-
come for the overall supply chain. These authors argue that the exercise of power 
ends up assuring the congruence in goals and activities of different associated part-
ners, particularly in the absence of a well-specified cooperation agreement. 
Most of the time, partners in supply chains are not completely aware of the broad 
scope of their power dimensions and therefore end up not actively managing their 
own power bases [Cordon and Vollmann, 2005].  Understanding and awareness of 
power structure is a crucial factor in management of supply chains and selection of 
the appropriate reactive or proactive strategy, since it can be easily connected to the 
dominance and interdependence of partners in the chain [Cox et al., 2004]. Thus 
awareness of power is central since exercising available power is very much depen-
dent on its awareness. 
Unlike other attributes of supply chain partnerships, power and its impact cannot 
be readily measured. Power, as stated earlier, is a mixture of complex social, econom-
ic and even psychological factors.  
Despite the existence of numerous contributions investigating the role of factors 
such as trust, commitment and shared meaning, the literature suggests that there is a 
lack of empirical research examining the effect of power in supply chains. Most of the 
earlier research works on this topic were done using surveys, interviews and analysis 
of field data [Cox, 1999; Maloni and Benton, 2000: Yeung et al., 2009]. These empir-
ical studies are generally case based, hence restricting the opportunity to develop 
general conclusions. This scarcity of empirical research examining the impacts of 
power exercised by partners in a supply chain is the central motivation for this work. 
Accordingly, the main goal of this study is to investigate the impact of coercive power 
on inventory replenishment decision. To this end, a controlled experiment is imple-
mented, using a participatory simulation platform. It allows simulating supply chains 
with balanced and imbalanced power regimes among different players and analyzing 
the resulting impact on inventory replenishment decisions. The experiment and fur-
ther analysis aim at answering the main question of this study: How does imbalanced 
coercive power and its awareness impact on the replenishment decision-making in 
supply chains? 
The next section provides the methodology and experimental approach.  Section 3 
provides the results and statistical analysis of the experiment. Finally, a discussion 
and conclusion are given in Section 4. 
2 Methodology 
To understand the dynamics and complexity of inventory replenishment decision-
making, supply chain simulation has been shown to be an appropriate research tool 
[Croson and Donohue 2002].  In particular, simulation helps creating a stable and 
controlled environment that allows reliable observations of the decision maker’s  
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behavior over time. In this study, a participatory simulation platform developed at 
Université Laval, Québec, Canada, called XBG-platform, is used for the experiments 
with human decision makers [Montreuil et al. 2008]. The XBG-platform mimics the 
dynamics of inventory replenishment in a decentralized, linear, four echelon supply 
chain. Order size and order time can be freely chosen; thus any order placement im-
plies a twofold decision about time and quantity. 
In Fig. 1, filled rectangles represent echelons with human participants, and empty 
rectangles represent echelons with computer agents. Human participants, thereafter 
subjects, played the role of the wholesaler and computer agents played factory, dis-
tributor, retailer and market roles. The main reason to use an experimental set-up with 
one single subject is to avoid interaction of human decision-making between eche-
lons. None of the subjects were made aware of the fact that the computer simulated 
other echelons.  
 
Fig. 1. Structure of the Supply Chain used in XBG simulation 
The market demand is stable and follows a normal distribution with a mean of 
3000 units/day and a standard deviation of 500 units/day, truncated at zero. This daily 
demand is randomly split into two orders per day. The demand information is un-
known to the subjects. 
This experiment is divided into three settings based on the power and awareness 
levels of the subjects. The imbalance of power between the echelons is achieved by 
varying the level of backorder costs between them. The awareness of power is incor-
porated with the introduction of contracts, which the player must sign before starting 
the game. The contract contains information about the business environment and 
commercial conditions, which makes the player aware of the power he/she holds over 
his/her supplier. The objective of the subject is to maximize his/her benefit, which is 
rewarded with a performance-based payment up to 60 CHF. Three different treat-
ments are used to generate the required levels of power and power awareness.  
─ Treatment 1: Balanced power. Backorder costs are identical for all echelons, there-
fore leading to power equilibrium between them. 
─ Treatment 2: Imbalanced power without awareness. The backorder cost to be paid 
by the distributor to the wholesaler (subject) is doubled, but the contract signed by 
the subject does not mention this fact. All other relations within the supply chain 
are in power equilibrium. 
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─ Treatment 3: Imbalanced power with awareness. The backorder cost to be paid by 
the distributor to the wholesaler (subject) is doubled and the contract signed by the 
subject explicitly mentions this fact. All other relations within the supply chain are 
in power equilibrium. 
The supply chain parameters considered in the experiments are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of the variables 
Variable  Symbol Variable  Symbol 
Ordered quantity  OQ Purchasing cost PC 
Ordering time interval OT Backorder cost BC 
On-hand inventory OI Inventory carrying cost IC 
Supply line SL Operating cost OC 
  
Total cost TC 
 
Twenty-four undergraduate and graduate students representing 15 nationalities 
from EPFL’s engineering and business majors participated in the experiment. The 
subjects consisted of 21% women and 79% men, with 29% of students in their Bache-
lor and 71% in their Master. To analyze the evolution of decision-making in the span 
of four months of game duration, the obtained data are divided bimonthly in 8 rounds. 
Consequently the database consists of a total of 24 subjects x 8 rounds = 192 results; 
i.e. 64 observations per treatment.  
3 Results and Statistical Analysis 
The obtained experimental results are analyzed over the whole game, separately for 
each treatment T1 (balanced power), T2 (power without awareness) and T3 power 
with awareness). The values reported for each treatment group (T1 to T3) represent 
the average of all the subjects in that particular setting throughout the duration of four 
months of game (64 observations). The statistical significance of all observations is 
checked using the Mann Whitney test (criterion p<0.05). These aggregated experi-
mental results are presented in the next four sub-sections as follows: 3.1 Replenish-
ment decision indicators, 3.2 Inventory indicators and 3.3 Cost components. 
3.1 Replenishment Decision Indicators 
As described earlier, the replenishment decision in this study involves two indictors, 
namely ordered quantity (OQ) and order time interval (OT). The results presented in 
Fig. 2 indicate no significant differences between treatments T1 and T2 but a very 
significant increase in the magnitude and variability of both OQ and OT in case of 
treatment T3, i.e. in case of power awareness. 
The above observations are statistically confirmed by the Mann Whitney test 
scores, as indicated in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. Mean OQ and OT for treatments T1, T2 and T3 
3.2 Inventory Indicators 
Two indicators are considered, the on-hand inventory (OI) and the supply line (SL). 
Fig. 3 shows no significant differences between treatments T1 and T2 but a signifi-
cant increase in the magnitude and variability of OI in case of treatment T3, i.e. in 
case of power awareness. With regard to SL, an increase in its variability, but not in 
its magnitude is noticed for treatment T3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean OI and SL for treatments T1, T2 and T3 
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The above observations on OI and SL are confirmed by the Mann Whitney test 
scores provided in Fig. 3. For OI, a significant difference is confirmed between treat-
ments T2 and T3. For all other comparisons, including T1/T3, no statistical signific-
ance is found (criterion p<0.05). 
With regard to SL, the statistical tests confirm also a significant difference between 
T2 and T3. Although there is an observable difference between T1 and T3, its signi-
ficance is not confirmed by the Mann Whitney test for the selected criterion of 
p<0.05. 
3.3 Cost Components  
As defined above, the considered cost components are: 
• The operating cost (OC), defined as the sum of the backorder (BC) and inventory 
carrying (IC) costs (OC=BC+IC), 
• The total cost (TC), defined as the sum of the operating (OC) and purchasing (PC) 
costs (TC=OC+PC=BC+IC+PC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Mean OC and TC for treatments T1, T2 and T3 
Both OC and TC are considered in the analysis of the experimental results and pre-
sented in Fig. 4. They indicate no significant differences between treatments T1 and 
T2, but a significant increase in the magnitude and variability of both OC and TC in 
case of treatment T3, i.e. in case of power awareness. 
The statistical analysis by Mann Whitney test scores confirms the results described 
above (see Fig. 4). For both OC and TC, the differences between treatment T3 versus 
treatments T1 and T2 are shown to be significant. 
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4 Discussions and Conclusion 
It is important to recall that the use of a controlled and reproducible experimental 
environment assures that all observations are strictly due to changes in the human 
replenishment decision process. Thus, the statistical analysis of the experimental data 
in the three different settings T1, T2 and T3, with varying power and awareness le-
vels, leads to the following main observations. 
─ Observation 1: Holding power without having its complete awareness creates no 
significant change in ordering behavior, inventory levels and costs compared to a 
power equilibrium situation (T2 versus T1). 
─ Observation 2: Holding power and being completely aware about it leads to a sig-
nificant impact in inventory replenishment decision, inventory levels and costs 
when compared to a power equilibrium situation (T3 versus T1).  
In particular, the following significant impacts are observed: a) Ordered quantity 
and Ordering time interval are increased, b) Inventory levels are increased c) Cost 
components are increased. 
As T1 (balanced power) and T2 (imbalanced power without awareness) lead to 
very similar results, the following discussion is limited to the comparison of two situ-
ations: T3 (imbalanced power with awareness) versus T1 (balanced power).   
The significant difference observed in the ordering behavior (increased ordered 
quantity (OQ) and increased ordering time interval (OT) can be considered as being at 
the origin of the other observations. In particular, the higher inventory level can rea-
sonably be attributed to the larger order quantity. It is interesting to notice that the 
supply line is not significantly changed, even though the purchase satisfaction is re-
duced. These suggest that the increased order quantity reduces the reactivity of the 
supplier (as partial delivery is not allowed) but does not significantly hamper its abili-
ty to ship; i.e. increase its backlog..  
 A first analysis of the global supply chain performances has shown that a signifi-
cant drop of the total supply chain profit occurs in case of exercising coercive power 
(T3).  This is an indication that coercive power in supply chain has a negative effect 
on its integration and efficiency. 
Through the use of a controlled experimental set-up it has thus been possible to ob-
serve that coercive power in supply chains significantly impacts its behavior and  
performances. It can in particular be concluded that, in a controlled and stable envi-
ronment, exercising coercive power within a supply chain tends to reduce its perfor-
mance. The Supply Chain costs are increased and the overall profit reduced, but the 
final customer satisfaction is not so much affected. A first analysis of the intra-supply 
chain results indicates also that the reduced total Supply Chain profit is shared in a 
less even way, which is detrimental to the partner under power dependence. This may 
ultimately lead to additional intra-chain dissatisfactions, and therefore to further de-
gradation of the Supply Chain performances with time. 
Real Supply chains are of course significantly more complex and less stable than 
the well-controlled experimental environment used in this study. Nevertheless, the 
obtained results being strictly due to human decision-making, it can be expected that 
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similar tendencies would be observed in practice. Consequently, it means that a strong 
imbalance of power in a decentralized Supply Chain is adverse. 
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